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Abstract 
 
This paper has three objectives. First, it aims at revealing the logic of interest rate setting pursued by 
monetary authorities of 12 new EU members. Using estimation of an augmented Taylor rule, we find 
that this setting was not always consistent with the official monetary policy. Second, we seek to shed 
light on the inflation process of these countries. To this end, we carry out an estimation of an open 
economy Philips curve (PC). Our main finding is that inflation rates were not only driven by backward 
persistency but also held a forward-looking component. Finally, we assess the viability of existing 
monetary arrangements for price stability. The analysis of the conditional inflation variance obtained 
from GARCH estimation of PC is used for this purpose. We conclude that inflation targeting is 
preferable to an exchange rate peg because it allowed decreasing the inflation rate and anchored its 
volatility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study aims at presenting evidence on the monetary policy rules and sources of the 
inflation process for open emerging economies, in particular 12 new EU member states 
(NMS) using a dataset from a recent post-transitional period (1999-2007). Consequently, our 
principal objectives can be resumed as follows. First, we aim at revealing the logic of interest 
rate setting pursued by monetary authorities of the NMS. Second, we seek to shed some light 
on the nature of the inflation process in these countries. Third, we asses the viability of the 
monetary arrangements of these countries for their domestic price stability. 
 
Twelve NMS (Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) are rather specific as compared to other 
emerging economies.1 They are small and very open economies. In addition, ten of them share 
a unique experience of transition from the central planning towards the market economy. The 
recent EU membership, coupled with the forthcoming adoption of the euro, represents again a 
unique external condition. In spite of these similarities, the official monetary policy 
arrangements and the exchange rate regimes pursued in these countries have been very 
heterogeneous.2 Both the similarities of the NMS as compared to other emerging economies 
and the diversity of their monetary policy arrangements make them an interesting subject of 
common comparative analysis. 
 
Since the celebrated paper by Taylor (1993), empirical research on monetary policy rules has 
shown logic in the decision-making process of independent central banks. Most of the 
empirical evidence (starting with Clarida et al., 1998) has been provided for the major central 
banks (the FED, Bank of England, Bank of Japan and the ECB). The studies found that the 
                                                          
1
 We use in the whole text the following country abbreviations: BUL – Bulgaria, CYP – Cyprus, CZE – the 
Czech Republic, EST – Estonia, HUN – Hungary, LAT – Latvia, LIT – Lithuania, MAL – Malta, POL – Poland, 
ROM – Romania, SLO – Slovenia, SVK – Slovakia. 
2
 While the Czech Republic and Poland maintained the inflation targeting since 1997 and 1998 respectively, 
Hungary adopted this framework only in 2001 and Romania in 2005 (before 2005 Romania pursued a version of 
monetary targeting). Slovakia pursued inflation targeting only implicitly. Slovenia applied a regime with 
monetary target. All of these countries had relatively flexible exchange rate regimes until Slovakia and Slovenia 
joined the ERM II in 2005. During our period of analysis (1999-2007) the Romanian leu underwent a currency 
reform (in 2005) and the central parity of the Slovak koruna within ERM II was readjusted (in 2007) as a 
consequence of continuing appreciation against the euro. The remaining countries relied on different versions of 
exchange rate peg. Estonia had a currency board with the euro (originally DEM) and joined ERM II in 2004. 
Latvia used a currency board with SDR until 2005 when it joined ERM II. The Lithuanian litas was pegged to 
the US dollar until 2002, when it was switched to the euro and the country joined ERM II in 2004. Cyprus had 
peg to the euro and Malta to a currency basket, succeeded by ERM II membership in 2005. Finally, Bulgaria still 
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short-term interest rate setting can be described by a version of the Taylor rule (TR), that 
suggests that the short-term interest rate responds to (observed or expected) inflation rate and 
the stance of economic activity (the output gap). The research aimed at emerging economies 
is scant. Studies focusing on Asian and Latin American countries (Filosa, 2001, Mohanty and 
Klau, 2007) confirmed that their central banks responded very strongly to exchange rates. In 
some cases, this response was of higher magnitude than the response to domestic inflation. 
This does not come as a surprise given that the exchange rates have been highly volatile in 
some emerging economies, which was often related to severe balance of payment crisis. The 
reality of emerging economies of Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) has been 
different. These countries did not experience similar turbulences and their monetary policy 
was rather affected by a unique process of economic transition. In addition, they opted 
recently for EU membership and are expected to adopt the euro in very near future. Therefore, 
the period where we can link the interest rate decisions to the developments of main 
macroeconomic variables is quite recent and very short. The estimated monetary policy rule is 
useful as a unifying framework to compare the (de-facto) monetary policy setting with the 
official (de-jure) monetary policy regime, which is a certain analogy to focus commonly 
applied at exchange rate regimes (Frömmel and Schobert, 2006a). However, such analysis 
rests on strong assumption that the short-term interest rate is exogenous variable set by the 
central bank. Countries that pursue exchange rate targets may use besides the interest rate also 
other instruments like the exchange rate interventions, which makes that the interest rate 
adjusts endogenously.   
 
A few studies aimed to provide evidence on monetary policy rules in NMS. Mohanty and 
Klau (2007) included three NMS (CZE, POL, HUN) in their larger sample of emerging 
countries. However, the choice of the estimation period (1995-2002) does not seem to be very 
reasonable given that CEEC were still strongly affected by the economic transition and 
monetary policy making was discretional. María-Dolores (2005) provided estimates for four 
NMS (CZE, POL, HUN, SVK), concluding that their interest rate setting (1998-2003) could 
be reasonably described by simple TR. However, it is likely that these results are biased due 
to omitted variables, since the author does not consider any explanatory variable behind 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
maintains a currency board with the euro (introduced originally in 1997 with the German mark). Markiewicz 
(2006) analyzes the determinants of the choice of different exchange rate strategies of CEEC. 
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inflation and the output gap in his empirical model.3 Frömmel and Schobert (2006b) paid 
attention to a variety of exchange rate regimes during the analyzed period (1994-2005) in the 
sample of six NMS. Consequently, they included the exchange rate as additional explanatory 
variable. The striking result is that the lagged interest rate is often the only significant variable 
(with coefficient close to unity). This implies that short-term interest rates de-facto followed 
random walks, which cannot be considered a reasonable description of the monetary policy.4 
 
While most empirical studies on monetary policy rules terminate with the presentation of the 
estimated coefficient we make one step further. Given the prominence of price stability as the 
central bank implicit or explicit objective, we additionally pursue analysis of the determinants 
of the inflation process in these countries. The purpose is to see whether differences in 
monetary policy setting imply specific features of inflation dynamics. The empirical research 
on the inflation dynamics is again vast for the major economies, mostly within the framework 
of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). This model suggests that expected inflation 
and marginal cost are the main determinants of current inflation rates (Galí and Gertler, 1999, 
Galí et al. 2001). Recent studies extended this model to adjust better to the data of open 
economies (Batini et al., 2005 or Rumler, 2007). The inflation process in the CEEC has 
several peculiarities. First of all, not long time ago it was still strongly influenced by 
institutional factors, such as price deregulation. The cross-country studies on inflation 
dynamics of the NMS are scarce and often focused on narrower issues such as the exchange 
rate pass-through (ERPT) into domestic prices (Coricelli et al., 2006) or inflation persistence 
(Franta et al., 2007). 
 
As regards out third objective, there are many empirical studies evaluating the performance of 
different monetary policy regimes with respect to price stability. The studies aim either at 
different policy episodes within one country (Kontonicas, 2004) or provide cross-country 
evidence (Ball and Sheridan, 2003). The results are rather ambiguous as to whether inflation 
targeting versus or exchange rate peg deliver better outcomes.  
 
Our extensions to previous research are several. First, we present coherent multi-country 
analysis based on large and recent dataset that allows us to draw some general conclusions 
and international comparisons. Many countries in our sample have not been subject to similar 
                                                          
3
 Although no results of autocorrelation test were presented, the reported p-value of Sargan overidentification 
test that were only slightly higher than 0.05 gives reasons to believe that the model is misspecified due to the 
omission of relevant regressors. 
4
 See Appendix for resume of estimates for the NMS. 
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analysis so far. Second, we study monetary policy and the inflation process together. Our 
specification of both relations is very general including a wide range of potential explanatory 
variables. Third, we evaluate the viability of different monetary policy regimes with the view 
of achieving the price stability by means of inflation volatility. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In next section, we present our econometric 
framework. In Section 3, we present our dataset and the results of the basic time series 
analysis. Section 4 reviews the estimates of monetary policy rules. Results on the inference of 
the inflation process properties and the evaluation of the viability of present policy rules for 
the price stability are reported in Section 5 and 6. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Econometric framework 
 
2.1 Monetary policy rules 
Taylor (1993) made a pioneer contribution to the modeling of monetary policy decisions of 
central banks. He proposed that the FED setting of the federal fund rate can be tracked as a 
simple function of the observed inflation rate (gap) and the stance of the real economic 
activity. Such interest rate rule can be written as: 
 ( )* *t t t ti i yβ pi pi γ ε+= + +−  (1) 
where *ti  is the short-term interest rate target, i  is the nominal equilibrium interest rate 
(consisting of the real equilibrium interest rate and the inflation target *pi ), tpi  is the inflation 
rate, ty  is the output gap and tε  is the error term.
5
 Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) suggested that 
some right-hand side variables of the equation (1) should enter as expected future values. This 
usually applies to the inflation rate since many central banks, especially those using direct 
inflation targeting (DIT), set interest rates with respect to inflation forecast than a current 
inflation rate. Consequently, the right-hand side variables enter under expectation E formed 
on the basis of available information tΩ :  
 ( ) ( ) ( )* *t t s t t s t k t t m t ti i E E y E xβ pi pi γ δ ε+ + + += +  Ω  − +  Ω  +  Ω  +       (2) 
This specification also includes additional variables tx  that can potentially affect the interest 
rate setting. Unfortunately, the data on past expectations of monetary authorities are hardly 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 6 
available. Therefore, the expected values of variables are commonly substituted by their 
actual realizations. This strategy introduces endogeneity into the empirical model as the 
disturbance term tε  now includes a prediction error t s t t sE pi pi+ + Ω  −   and as such is 
correlated with the regressor t spi + . The instrumental variables (IV) estimators are needed to 
deal with this issue. Finally, most central banks smooth the interest rate changes over time as 
not to have any disruptive effects on economy. Such policy inertia can be described by partial 
adjustment mechanism: 
 ( ) *1 1t t t ti i iρ ρ υ−= + − +  (3) 
where the actual short-term interest rate ti  is a combination of the interest rate target 
*
ti , 
implied from the policy rule, and the lagged value (usually one period) of the interest rate 1ti −  
( ρ  expresses the intensity of smoothing). Following this practice we can write our empirical 
model used for the estimation of monetary policy rules as a combination of equations (2) and 
(3): 
 ( )( )1 1t t t s t k t m ti i y xρ ρ α βpi γ δ υ− + + += + − + + + +  (4) 
where all the variables have the previous meaning, α is a constant term and the additional 
variables t mx +  are those proposed in different studies and: the foreign interest rate, the long-
term interest rate, the exchange rate, monetary growth, and asset prices. It is evident that some 
of these variables can be highly relevant for small open economies. According to the equation 
(4), the policy can be either backward- or forward-looking as all the sub-indices can take 
positive or negative value. We use one period lagged inflation in case of backward-looking 
rule ( s = −1 ) and one period ahead inflation ( s =1 ) in case of forward-looking specification.6 
The output gap always enters in a present or a past value ( 0k ≤ ) alike the additional variables 
( 0m ≤ ).7 Because the error term tυ  is a linear combination of forecast errors of the right-hand 
side variables and the original exogenous disturbance tε , it shall be orthogonal to the present 
information set tΩ , which can be exploited as moment condition: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5
 The empirical studies mostly use the inflation rate as regressor instead of the inflation gap (difference between 
the inflation rate and its target). This is because the inflation target is not explicitly defined in many countries. As 
long as it is constant over the estimation period, the use of the inflation rate does not alter the estimation results. 
6
 To avoid the problem of weak instruments in GMM framework, we use only one lead of inflation rate in the 
forward-looking specification even though the forecasting/targeting horizon is usually 1-2 years. Moreover, the 
prediction error (difference between inflation expectation and its actual future realization) increase in longer 
horizon. 
7
 We instrument all the regressors with their lagged values since many of them are rather predeterminated than 
strictly exogenous. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1t t s t s t t k t k t t m t m t tE y E y x E xυ ρ β pi pi γ δ ε+ + + + + += − − −  Ω  + −  Ω  + −  Ω  +       (5) 
We estimate different versions of the model (4) by means of Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM). Two lags of endogenous and exogenous variables of each specification are used as 
IV.8 The GMM weighting matrix was chosen in accordance with the Newey and West (1994) 
covariance estimator, which is robust to the presence of both heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form (HAC Consistent Covariances). The correlation in moment 
conditions was soaked up by means of previous VAR(1) estimation for IV (pre-whitening). 
 
2.2 Inflation process in open economies 
The predominant New Keynesian literature disregards a traditional backward-looking PC in 
favor of a forward-looking PC derived from a model of price-setting behavior of 
monopolistically competitive firms. The empirical NKPC can be written as: 
 1t t t t tE mc upi β pi γ+=  Ω  + +   (6) 
where the current inflation rate tpi  depends on its expected value pursuant to the rational 
expectations of the economic agents (based on the information set tΩ ) and on marginal cost 
tmc  that is deemed to be the main inflation-forcing variable. However, this model was found 
to be at odds with data. First, it does not account for the inflation persistence. Second, the 
marginal cost is an unobservable variable that must be proxied, typically by unit labor cost. 
Such measure of marginal cost may not be sufficiently representative for small economies that 
import significant part of intermediate inputs. More importantly, the inflation rates in small 
economies may have numerous external determinants unrelated to price setting of domestic 
firms. Therefore, to model inflation dynamics, we depart from a hybrid NKPC where current 
inflation rate depends on both its previous value and expectation of future value (Fuhrer and 
Moore, 1995, Galí and Gertler, 1999):9 
    ( ) 1 11t t t t t tE y upi β pi β pi γ− += − +  Ω  + +   (7) 
Given the controversy about the marginal cost tmc , we use a traditional cyclical measure of 
the economic activity – the output gap ty . We include into the model additional variables that 
can have effect on inflation of open economies. Svensson (2000) derived the NKPC for open 
                                                          
8
 Mavroeidis (2005) showed that the practice of including too many lags of IV leads to a debilitation of the 
Sargan-Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. Two lags allow performing the test without significant 
distortion of its power. 
9
 Galí and Gertler (1999) derived this hybrid PC in a framework where part of the firms set prices by means of 
backward-looking rule of thumb. 
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economy augmented by the exchange rate.10 Empirical studies aimed at the quantification of 
the ERPT into domestic prices (Gagnon and Ihrig, 2004, Campa and Goldberg, 2005, 
Coricelli et al., 2006) employed a similar inflation equation with two additional variables 
accompanying the exchange rate. First, the foreign inflation rate represents a direct 
transmission of foreign prices to domestic ones. Second, the lagged domestic interest rate 
tracks the effect of domestic monetary policy.11 Accordingly, we use general specification 
that takes into account all these possible determinants of inflation dynamics: 
 
exp
1 1 2 1 1 1 4
for
t t t t t t t ty s i upi α β pi β pi γ δpi η µ− + − − −= + + + + + + +  (8) 
where α  is an intercept representing variables having constant effect on the inflation rate.12 
Unlike most empirical NK literature, we do not impose that the coefficients of the backward-
looking term 1tpi −  and the forward-looking term 
exp
1tpi +
 
sum up to unity.13 The exogenous 
variables that can driven inflation are the output gap 1ty − , the foreign inflation rate
 
for
tpi , the 
exchange rate 1ts −  and the domestic interest rate 4ti − .  The lag of the output gap is set to one 
as in a standard PC. The interest rate enters with four lags since the horizon of the monetary 
transmission is around one year. The exchange rate enters with one or two lags pursuant to the 
VAR studies confirming that the ERPT has the strongest effect within one or two quarters. 
 
The model specification brings about some econometric complications. The main issue is 
related to the forward-looking inflation term. Because inflation expectations are typically not 
available, they must be proxied by realized values of inflation. The IV should be employed to 
deal with the endogeneity that arise in the same fashion as in the forward-looking policy rule.  
Moreover, multicollinearity can arise if the backward- and forward-looking inflation terms are 
strongly correlated. To deal with both problems, we proxy the expected inflation exp1tpi +  by one-
period-ahead inflation gap. This variable is constructed as a deviation of inflation in t+1 from 
its trend value obtained by Hodrick-Prescott filter. The multicollinearity is avoided since the 
correlation of this inflation gap with one lag of inflation rate is not very strong. The use of 
inflation gap in t+1 also deals with potential endogeneity because it is de facto an IV for one-
lead of inflation. It is very strongly correlated with inflation in t+1 but not necessary with the 
                                                          
10
 Batini et al. (2005) used NKPC augmented by variables of foreign competition, relative prices of imports and 
oil prices for the empirical analysis of the UK inflation.  
11
 These studies use VAR methods as they are interested in the temporal dimension of the ERPT to domestic 
prices. The forward-looking inflation component is not included since the VAR methodology is not suitable to 
deal with the issues of endogeneity. 
12
 The presence of the intercept is relevant especially for the estimation in the panel setting, where it represents 
the country fixed-effect. 
13
 This condition assures that there is no trade-off between inflation and output in the long-term. 
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error term. If endogeneity does not arise, then OLS and GMM must provide reasonably 
similar estimates. We use OLS as a benchmark and GMM for a robustness check. An 
important advantage of OLS is that it can be simply extended to ARCH model that allows 
capturing the time-varying volatility potentially present in inflation series. In particular, we 
use the most general and common model of volatility, GARCH (1,1). The corresponding 
variance equation can be written as: 
 
2 2 2
1 1 2 1t t tσ ω ν ξ ν σ− −= + +  (9) 
where 2tσ  is the conditional variance (one-period ahead forecast variance), the constant term 
ω  is the long-term variance, 2 1tξ −  is the ARCH term (the squared residuals from the last 
period) representing the impact of new information about volatility from the last period, and 
2
1tσ −  is the GARCH term representing the impact of the forecast variance from the last period. 
The GARCH estimates of the PC parameters are not only more efficient than OLS in case of 
conditional heteroskedasticity but this framework also allows obtaining estimates of the 
conditional variance 2tσ . The conditional variance of inflation can be used apart from the 
inflation level as another measure of the price stability. Highly volatile inflation strengthens 
the inflation expectations of private agents, which according to the NKPC drive up current 
inflation rate. Therefore, the estimates of the variance equation and the implied conditional 
variance series may shed some light on the viability of existing monetary policy.  
 
3. Data and time series analysis 
 
3.1 Data description 
Our dataset consists of quarterly data ranging from 1999/1.Q till 2007/4.Q. The series are 
slightly shorter for some variables or countries but in all cases, they cover at least 8 years. The 
principal data source is Eurostat (inflation rate, GDP, industrial production, exchange rate, 
monetary aggregate M3, share index, interest rates). Missing data for some countries were 
obtained from national central banks (long-term interest rates). 
 
The short-term interest rate is the 3-month interbank interest rate. The overnight interbank 
interest rate is used for a robustness check in the policy rule estimation. The foreign interest 
rate (used in an augmented policy rule) is represented by 3-month EURIBOR (EONIA is used 
for a robustness check). The inflation rate is measured as a yearly change in the harmonized 
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consumer price index (HCPI, 2005 is the base year).14 The foreign inflation rate (used in an 
open economy PC) is a yearly change in the HCPI of the Euro area. The long-term interest 
rate is measured by 10-year government bond yield. The output gap is a difference between 
the logarithm of the current value of the seasonally adjusted GDP (in millions of euros in 
1995 prices) and the trend value obtained by Hodrick-Prescott filter (the smoothing parameter 
set to 1600).15 The industrial production index is used for a robustness check in the monetary 
policy rule estimation. The exchange rate is the real effective exchange rate index (REER, 
against 12 main trading partners, deflated by CPI, 1999 is the base year) and the nominal 
exchange rate against the euro (in unit of euros for a unit of domestic currency).16 A yearly 
change of the exchange rate is used for the estimation and its deviation from HP trend for a 
robustness check. The monetary growth is proxied by a yearly change in the seasonally 
adjusted M3 aggregate (in national currency, common definition by Eurostat). Asset prices 
are proxied by the share index of local stock exchange (rebased for all countries to 
2001=100), whose yearly change is used.17 
 
3.2 Time series analysis 
The time series used for the empirical analysis are subject to thorough unit root testing (ADF, 
PP, KPSS tests). The stationary is confirmed for all variables besides the inflation rates and 
the interest rates. These findings lead us to test whether the nonstationary variables are 
cointegrated. The cointegration is tested by means of Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test 
(Engle and Granger, 1987), which is ADF tests of unit root applied at residuals of the 
auxiliary regression with nonstationary variables. The cointegrating vector in case of 
monetary policy rule usually consists of the short-term interest rate, the inflation rate (DIT 
countries) and/or the foreign interest rate (some DIT countries and countries with exchange 
rate pegs). In term of the Phillips curve, we find cointegrating relation between the inflation 
rate, the foreign inflation rate and the lagged interest rate. In a few cases when cointegration is 
                                                          
14
 Although CPI inflation is more relevant both for monetary authority and for private agents, HCPI is strongly 
correlated with CPI and is a comparable measure for all countries in the sample.  
15
 The limits of HP filter for identification of the output gap are well known. However, given the sample of the 
countries, we are unable to employ additional methods. 
16
 An increase means appreciation as so to be consistent with the REER, whose increase means appreciation. 
17
 There are two controversies related to asset prices in empirical analysis of monetary policy rules. First, what is 
correct measure of asset prices? In particular, whether is the share index sufficiently representative or whether 
the housing prices should be included as well. Second, how to measure the misalignment in asset prices given 
the difficulties to estimate their equilibrium value. The latter problem can be even more pronounced for post-
transitional economies of the NMS. 
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rejected, we use first differences of variables for the regression (variables in the policy rule 
for CYP and LAT).18 
It has become common to include the foreign interest rate (of dominant economy) as an 
additional regressor in estimated policy rules (Clarida et al., 1998). However, even thought 
the short-term interest rates of most NMS are highly correlated with the interest rates in the 
Euro area it does not automatically imply any causal relationship. For this reason, we apply 
the Granger causality test. In particular, we test whether the lagged values of the euro short-
term interest rate provide any additional information about the present values of the short-
term interest rate of each NMS while the reversed causality is not present.19 The results are 
the following: we cannot reject (at 5% significance level) that the euro short-term interest rate 
caused the short-term interest rate of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta and Slovakia. While the influence of the ECB interest rate setting is expected to be 
found for countries with exchange rate pegs to the euro, it is an interesting finding for 
countries maintaining a flexible exchange rate.  
 
The causality is also puzzling in case of the relationship between the short-term and the long-
term interest rates. They are correlated in all countries but the causal relationship is not self-
evident, in fact, it may even run from the short- to long-term interest rate as long as the latter 
are determined as expected future short-term interest rate. Mehra (2001) argued that the long-
term interest rate carries information about inflation expectations and should be included as an 
explanatory variable in the estimated monetary policy rule.  For this reason, we test whether 
the long-term interest rate Granger-caused the short-term interest rate. This causality is not 
rejected for the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia. Although this test has various 
limitations, we consider its results as a preliminary indication of whether the foreign short-
                                                          
18
 The results reported in Appendix. There are several limitations of the AEG test. First, note that lagged values 
of the dependent variable had to be included in the cointegrating regression as to obtain I(0) residuals. This is 
rather problematic because the omission of the short-term dynamics shall not alter the results if the I(1) variables 
are cointegrated. However, note that AEG tests relies on ADF testing (with specific critical values, e.g. Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 1993) of the residuals from an auxiliary regression with I(1) variables. Given the size of our 
sample, the low power of the single-equation ADF test may affect the AEG test results as well. Second, the 
critical values are very sensitive to presence of heteroscedaticity and autocorrelation in the data. Third, the power 
of the test weakens if the data are seasonally adjusted. Finally, the results of the AEG test are sensitive to 
normalization; in particular switching between dependent and explanatory variables in the cointegrating 
regression implies different residuals. However, in spite of these limitations the AEG test is the best suited for 
our empirical framework, which is single equation with simple dynamics. We also employ maximum likelihood 
test of Johanssen (1991) allowing for more than one cointegrating relationships. This test confirmed in all cases 
our previous results. The error-correction model (ECM) allows testing cointegration together with the estimation 
of the empirical model. However, the use of the ECM is unfeasible given that we have many possible 
explanatory variables (and therefore various potential cointegrating relations) and we have to deal with other 
issues like endogeneity. 
19
 The test results are reported in Appendix. 
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term interest rates and the domestic long-term interest rate could give any information about 
short-term interest rate setting in the NMS. 
 
4. Empirical evidence on the monetary policy rules in the NMS 
 
To begin, we have fitted the generic form of the Taylor rule as a benchmark. These results are 
reported in Table 1. We can see that this simple policy rule does not hold for any country in 
our sample. Although the inflation coefficient is positive and significant in some cases, the 
overall fit of the model is very low. Moreover, a simple inspection of the Durbin-Watson 
statistics points to serial correlation, possibly due to model misspecification. This is not 
surprising, given that all these countries are small open economies, where various constraints 
condition the interest rate setting. In addition, this specification does not take into account that 
monetary policy authorities may be rather forward-looking and smooth its actions over time.20 
In any case, these results point that if any systematic interest rate setting existed, it differed 
across the countries. This does not come as a surprise given diversity of official monetary and 
exchange rate arrangements in the NMS. 
 
Table 1.: OLS estimates of backward-looking TR 
 
 
Country α (const.) β (pit -1) γ (yt-1) R 2 DW 
BUL 3.74 (0.27) 0.11 (0.04) -0.33 (0.26) 0.12 1.07 
CYP 4.62 (0.43) 0.05 (0.14) 0.56 (0.16) 0.18 0.16 
CZE 1.75 (0.27) 0.77 (0.09) -0.44 (0.25) 0.46 0.22 
EST 1.67 (0.83) 0.64 (0.25) -0.23 (0.17) 0.19 0.35 
HUN 4.98 (0.71) 0.67 (0.10) -0.27 (0.76) 0.53 0.47 
LAT 6.12 (0.63) -0.07 (0.14) 0.81 (0.20) 0.29 0.51 
LIT 4.57 (0.61) 0.27 (0.17) -0.61 (0.59) 0.06 0.38 
MAL 3.75 (0.21) 0.04 (0.09) 0.26 (0.09) 0.23 0.37 
POL 2.96 (0.54) 1.58 (0.15) -0.08 (0.35) 0.86 0.56 
ROM -0.14 (1.91) 1.23 (0.15) -0.54 (1.36) 0.75 0.49 
SLO 2.08 (0.67) 0.90 (0.10) 0.78 (0.31) 0.91 0.56 
SVK 3.79 (0.80) 0.54 (0.13) 1.10 (0.60) 0.27 0.22 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients statistically significant at 5% in 
bold. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic. 
 
The GMM estimates of the monetary policy rule (specification (4)) with the highest 
explanatory power are reported in Table 2.21 The countries in the upper block maintained a 
                                                          
20
 These basic result were confirmed when we have used the output gap derived from industrial production 
(instead of GDP) and overnight interest rate (instead of 3 month interest rates). 
21
 Note again that all the specifications were first estimated in levels. I(1) variables in the best adjusting 
specifications were tested for the cointegration. No reasonable cointegrating relation was found for Cyprus and 
Latvia. The results for Cyprus come from estimation in first differences. We do not find any well-specified 
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flexible exchange rate during most of the analyzed period, the countries in the lower block 
used hard exchange rates pegs. 
 
Table 2.: GMM estimates of the monetary policy rule with the highest explanatory power for each NMS 
 
 
Country 
ρ 
(it-1) 
(1-ρ)α 
(const.) 
(1-ρ)β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
(1-ρ)γ 
(yt-1) 
(1-ρ)δ 
(it-1
f
 ,it
f
*) 
(1-ρ)ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-
stat. 
CZE 0.63 (0.04) -0.62 (0.19) 0.16* (0.03) -0.23 (0.08) 0.41 (0.10)   0.97 0.24 0.88 
HUN  0.71 (0.11) 1.18 (0.92) 0.20* (0.08) -0.12 (0.58)     0.87 0.17+ 0.80 
POL  0.77 (0.02) 0.00 (0.11) 0.51* (0.07) -0.13 (0.12)     0.98 0.90 0.26 
ROM   0.56 (1.52) 1.29* (0.05) 0.27 (0.22)     0.92 0.15 0.33 
SLO 0.78 (0.12) -0.66 (0.70) 0.38* (0.16) -0.49 (0.38)     0.93 0.87 0.80 
SVK  0.90 (0.03) 0.21 (0.41) -0.12 (0.03) -0.24 (0.08) 0.23 (0.11)   0.94 0.39 0.47 
BUL   1.46 (0.43) 0.04 (0.08) -0.64 (0.20) 0.79 (0.16)   0.44 0.58 0.73 
CYP (diff.) 0.22 (0.08) -0.07 (0.08) -0.14 (0.05) 0.10 (0.12) 0.69 (0.19)   0.35 0.57+ 0.69 
EST  0.54 (0.02) 0.04 (0.13) 0.09* (0.03) 0.06 (0.05) 0.39 (0.08)   0.92 0.76 0.74 
LAT (diff.) - - - - - - - - - -   - - - 
LIT (xt – REER) 0.39 (0.02) 0.14 (0.44) -0.10 (0.01) 0.30 (0.05) 0.69 (0.14) 0.11 (0.04) 0.97 0.99 0.69 
MAL   1.03 (0.14) 0.12 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.79 (0.03)   0.95 0.55+ 0.28 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients statistically significant at 5% in bold. diff – relation estimated in first 
differences, otherwise in levels. xt – REER – additional variable is the real effective exchange rate. LB is p-value of Ljung-Box 
test for 1. order serial correlation (+ indicated result after correction AR(1) in residuals). J-stat is p-value of Sargan 
overidentification test. 
 
The specifications of policy rules with the highest explanatory power for the DIT countries 
(CZE, HUN, POL, ROM) are all forward-looking. This seems logical since the inflation 
forecast is used as an intermediate policy target under the DIT. The long-term inflation 
multiplier (estimated short-term coefficient adjusted for the interest rate smoothing) exceeds 
unity for Poland and Romania but not for the Czech Republic and Hungary. The Taylor 
principle proposes that the monetary policy is stabilizing only if the nominal interest rate is 
increased by a larger amount than the inflation rate in order to increase the real interest rate. 
This means that the long-term inflation multiplier β should be higher than unity (Clarida et al., 
2000). However, the interpretation for small open economies is less straightforward given 
additional variables affecting the interest rate setting (Linnemann and Schabert, 2006). For 
instance, for the Czech Republic we find that the short-term interest rate adjusted not only to 
the expected inflation rate but also to the interest rate in the Euro area.22 The latter response 
can be interpreted as an additional anti-inflationist policy in so much the Czech inflation rate 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
model for Latvia and therefore do not report any estimates for this country. The detailed results for each country 
are reported in Appendix. 
22
 Let us recall that there is Granger causality running from the euro interest rate to the Czech one and the euro 
interest rate enters the cointegrating vector.  
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covariated with inflation in the Euro area.23 The estimated policy rules of Hungary, Poland 
and Romania is consistent with the official policy regime - the inflation targeting - aimed 
solely at domestic price stability. The results for Slovenia resemble the rules of previous 
countries, although Slovenia did not officially adopt the DIT. The specification with the 
highest explanatory power is clearly forward-looking in inflation, with long-term coefficient 
close to unity. At the same time, we reject any response to the euro interest rate. In fact, the 
euro interest rate was neither part of the cointegrating vector nor Granger-caused the 
Slovenian interest rate. This finding is surprising because even though Slovenia officially 
pursued a managed floating, the exchange rate of the Slovenian tolar and the euro was 
relatively stable during most of the sample period.24 The insignificance of the monetary 
growth is also counter-intuitive, given that the Central Bank of Slovenia officially announced 
monetary targets. Yet, for the sake of cross-country comparability, we use only yearly change 
in the monetary aggregate M3 rather than its deviation from specific target value. Slovakia is 
an opposite case since it claimed to pursue the DIT but we cannot detect a positive and 
significant response to domestic inflation (it is even negative in the best-adjusting 
specification). On the other hand, we find a very strong response to the euro interest rate.25 
One possible explanation can be that the inflation targeting in Slovakia was only implicit and 
the central bank exercised a lot of discretion. According to our results, it tried to mimic the 
euro interest rate. It is in fact in line with the Slovak national bank official stance that the DIT 
was implemented as a tool of convergence to the Euro area. 
 
The policy rules estimates obtained for countries that maintained a fixed exchange rate 
regimes feature a lack of autonomous monetary policy aimed at domestic macroeconomic 
developments. The principal variable driving the domestic interest rate is the euro interest 
rate. Above this, we detect a positive response to domestic inflation in Estonia and Malta and 
to the real effective exchange rate in Lithuania. Latvia is the only country in the sample where 
                                                          
23
 The correlation coefficient of the Czech inflation rate with the average inflation rate in the Euro area is around 
0.5. Part of the response of the Czech interest rate to the euro interest rate may be in effect response to domestic 
inflation. This hypothesis is confirmed when we instead of the euro interest rate include the residual of 
regression of the euro interest rate on the Czech inflation rate. Such residual represents the euro interest rate 
variance unrelated to Czech inflation rate. While the coefficient of this residual is the same as the previous 
coefficient of the euro interest rate, the long-term multiplier of the inflation forecast increase to unity. 
24
 The statistical insignificance of the euro interest rate can be also related to the multicollinearity between 
lagged interest rate and the euro interest rate (correlation coefficient 0.83). Because the domestic interest rate 
was almost perfectly correlated with the inflation rate (coef. 0.95), the multicollinearity between the euro interest 
rates and the domestic inflation (coef. 0.83) also arise here. When we similarly as in Czech case remove the 
variance of the euro interest rate related to Slovenia inflation rate, the residual enters the estimated policy rule 
with positive sign and is significant at 10%. 
 15
we fail to identify any consistent interest rate rule. It can indicate that the central bank did not 
apply any systematic interest rate setting but also that short-term interest rate endogenously 
adjusted to exchange rate interventions aimed at exchange rate stabilization. Moreover, the 
Latvian interest rate was rather flat during the analyzed period making the monetary policy 
rule regression unfeasible. The policy rule estimates obtained for these countries can be 
interpreted that exchange rate fixing was implemented by means of an interest rate peg. This 
finding goes against the argument of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) that interest rate fixing 
cannot guarantee interest rate peg, which was recently questioned by Benigno et al. (2007). 
However, it is important to bear in mind that our framework does not allow distinguishing 
between exogenous and endogenous changes of the short-term interest rate. 
 
The results obtained for the NMS feature some general differences as compared to the 
evidence established for developed countries. First, the importance of the output gap 
(coefficient γ) is smaller. A possible explanation can be that that neither the DIT nor policy of 
an exchange rate peg left room for the output stabilization. Nevertheless, the estimated 
coefficients of the output gap can be also downwardly biased as the output gap is usually 
estimated with a lot of noise. This problem can be more pronounced for emerging countries 
since their supply and demand shocks are of higher magnitude, making the output gap 
estimates imprecise. Second, the interest rate smoothing parameter is generally smaller than 
found for developed countries. This can mean that fast and strong response of the interest rate 
is chosen as make monetary policy more credible in emerging countries. A notable example is 
Romania, where the monetary policy does not even seem to smooth the interest rate. Third, 
other variables (the long-term interest rate, asset prices, monetary growth, and the exchange 
rate) that were deemed to be relevant for explanation of short-term interest rate dynamics in 
developed countries proved to have negligible impact in the NMS.26 Why this can be so? In 
case of the long-term interest rate, it may be because it reflects more country’s sovereign risk 
than expected inflation. The central bank could be interested in stabilizing it if the risk 
premium was very variable or if the country’s public sector was highly indebted. Yet, none of 
these applies to the NMS. The negligence of asset prices developments can be linked to a 
simple fact that assets, in particular stocks, represent a smaller part of household holdings and 
are thus less important for policy decisions. Moreover, their variability is usually higher, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
25
 The importance of the euro interest rate for the Slovak interest rate setting is again confirmed by Granger 
causality test and cointegration test. 
26
 Some of the coefficients are significant but have only marginal size. However, inclusion of these variables 
mostly does not improve the fit of the model. See Appendix for detailed results. 
 16
which would imply too much interest rate volatility if the central bank decided to respond to 
them. However, it is also possible that the response was asymmetric, i.e. that the monetary 
authorities consider them only when their misalignment exceeded certain threshold. As for the 
possible effect of housing price on monetary policy that was not considered here, it was found 
both for developed countries and the CEEC that housing prices evolve closely with other 
variables like the GDP or real wages (Égert and Mihaljek, 2008). Therefore, housing prices 
may not provide additional information for monetary policy above the other variables. 
Moreover, most studies report that housing prices are endogenous to monetary policy stance 
given their strong response to real interest rates (Terrones and Otrok, 2004). The omission of 
monetary developments as relevant information for monetary policy is consistent with the 
findings for developed countries. Finally, the lack of any consideration of exchange rate 
developments for interest rates setting is rather surprising given that the NMS are very open 
economies. There are several possible explanations for this finding. First of all, the exchange 
rate is logically not an interesting variable in countries maintaining exchange rate peg. On the 
contrary, the DIT countries may face a trade-off between domestic inflation objective and 
exchange rate stabilization. However, the exchange rate impact on domestic interest rate can 
be present implicitly. (a) It can be hidden in the response of domestic interest rate to the 
foreign interest rate.27 (b) The exchange rate changes can be completely passed-through to 
domestic prices. Consequently, a central bank responding to the CPI inflation implicitly 
considers the exchange rate as well (Svensson, 2000). (c) The ERPT into domestic prices can 
be, instead, very limited and a monetary policy authority aimed at domestic price stability 
does not have to consider the exchange rate developments at all. This claim seems to be 
justified by studies showing that the ERPT was endogenously restrained by low inflation 
environment promoted by DIT (Taylor, 2000). (d) A direct response to exchange rate may be 
feasible strategy for DIT countries if they were to miss the inflation target due to strong 
currency depreciation.28 However, as the NMS were not exposed to this danger unlike some 
other emerging countries using the DIT (Brazil, South Africa). (e) Taylor (2001) argues that 
the interest rate response to (real) exchange rate can be only temporal. The interest rate can be 
decreased following exchange rate appreciation in order to support the domestic exports. 
                                                          
27
 The logic is the following; the increase of foreign interest rate should lead in case of international capital 
arbitrage to depreciation of domestic currency. Yet, when the domestic monetary policy follows the foreign 
interest rate setting, this does not happen. Therefore, increasing domestic interest rate in response to foreign 
interest rate increase is a substitute for interest rate increase that would have to follow the depreciation of 
domestic currency. 
28
 Mohanty and Klau (2007) found a direct response of the interest rate to the exchange rate in emerging 
economies with significant exchange rate volatility. 
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However, as domestic currency weakens the interest rate may be increased again to face the 
imported inflation. Given that we use quarterly data, these two effects may cancel out within 
the same period and they are not detected in our regression.  
 
The specification with the highest explanatory power for each country was subject to series of 
robustness checks.29 (a) The overnight interbank interest rate is used as dependent variable 
instead of 3-month interbank interest rate. The fit of such specification is worse in most cases. 
The dynamics of overnight interest rates reflects, in fact, more the liquidity conditions in the 
banking sector than the macroeconomic fundamentals. Consequently, this variable may not be 
viable as a measure of policy stance.30 (b) We include the inflation gap (deviation of actual 
inflation rate from the trend value obtained by HP filter) instead of inflation rate for the sub-
sample of countries where we find convincing evidence on the response to inflation (CZE, 
HUN, POL, ROM, SLO). The trend value is meant to proxy the inflation target by a smoothed 
series. The gap is consequently the deviation of actual interest rate from the (time-varying) 
target. The inflation gap is significant only in the case of the Czech Republic.31 (c) We use the 
output gap calculated from the industrial production instead of GDP series. Given that the 
correlation between the two measures of output gap has been very high in all but two 
countries (Slovakia – correlation coefficient 0.3 and Cyprus -0.2), the previous results are not 
altered. Unfortunately, it is above the extent of this study apply alternative methods of the 
output gap estimation. (d) We use the deviation from the HP trend value of the exchange rate 
instead of its yearly change. Although the corresponding coefficient turns significant in some 
cases, its size is unreasonable and the overall fit of the model is always worse. 
 
The estimates reported in Table 2 allows us to perform a counterfactual experiment by 
comparing the actual interest rate with the implied interest rate path (in-sample forecast from 
the specification with the highest explanatory power) and use the deviation of these two series 
as indication of monetary policy shocks.32  These results are reported in Figure 1. 
                                                          
29
 These results are not reported here and are available upon request. 
30
 While the Granger causality of 3-month EURIBOR on domestic 3-month interest rates was confirmed for 
several countries in the sample, the Granger causality of EONIA on domestic overnight interest rate was found 
only for the Czech Republic. 
31
 The inflation gap is very strongly correlated with inflation rate for the Czech Republic (0.9) but very weakly 
for Romania (0.3). The other countries have intermediate level of correlation (0.6). 
32
 The residual can be interpreted as a shock only if the empirical model is correctly specified. 
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Figure 1.: The counterfactual experiment: the comparison of the target interest rate from the monetary 
policy rule with the highest explanatory power and the actual interest rate 
 
We can see that monetary policy shocks are not practically present in countries pursuing DIT. 
The underlying reason could be that this monetary arrangement rests on confidence and any 
discretionary action can have problematic consequences. One notable exception is Hungary, 
where we identify a significant deviation of these two series between late 2002 and 2004. 
Therefore, it is interesting to examine this episode in more detail. The Hungarian forint 
became subject of a speculative attack at the end of 2002 and in early 2003. The central bank 
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was pursuing DIT but, at the same time, it pegged the forint exchange rate to the euro (with a 
relative wide fluctuation band of ± 15%) in order to meet the requirements of the ERM II. The 
markets expected that, if any inconsistency appeared between these two policy objectives, the 
central bank would ensure its inflation target rather than the declared bands of the exchange 
rate fluctuation. Surprisingly, the Hungarian central bank decided for the second option 
(intervention against the Hungarian forint), which is related to a strong decrease of domestic 
interest rates in late 2002. This decrease was inconsistent with the interest rate setting in 
place. The result of such measure was a significant inflation increase and the central bank had 
to raise disproportionally the interest rates in the subsequent period.33 
 
The departures of the actual interest rate from the target value are more common in some 
countries with fixed exchange rate, like Bulgaria or Cyprus. This seems to be rather related to 
lower overall fit of the estimated mode than to policy shocks. In the case of Latvia, we do not 
find any specification with a reasonable fit. However, as we pointed out above, if the interest 
rate adjusts endogenously to exchange rate interventions, the estimated interest rate rule 
cannot provide a good approximation of monetary policy. 
 
5. Empirical evidence on the inflation process in the NMS 
 
We have already discussed above that the sources of inflation dynamics can be quite complex 
in open economies. For this reason, we use an encompassing specification of an open 
economy PC (8). The OLS estimates of this model are shown in Table 3. 
 
We can see that the inflation rates of the NMS are driven not only by their backward 
persistence (coefficient 1β ) but they also hold significant forward-looking component 
(coefficient 2β ). Studies critical with the NKPC (Bårdsen et al., 2004) argue that the effect of 
the forward-looking term vanishes once more lags of inflation are included. We include up to 
four lags of inflation to test this claim. While these turn mostly insignificant, the significance 
of the forward-looking term is not affected. Conversely, when the expected inflation is 
dropped, the backward-looking term does not increase substantially. In addition, we test the 
restricted version, where 1β  and 2β sum to unity pursuant the original NKPC (Galí and 
Gertler, 1999). The overall fit of such model is always lower since they never sum to unity in 
                                                          
33
 This episode also confirms a problematic coexistence of inflation targeting regime, aimed at domestic 
inflation, and the exchange rate stabilization. As the fluctuation band was relatively wide, the Hungarian forint 
did not experience any disturbances in other moments. 
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the unrestricted version. However, given that we do not work with genine inflation 
expectations, we do not interpret this finding in terms of inflation-output trade-off.34  
 
Table 3.: OLS estimates of an open economy Phillips curve for each NMS 
 
Country 
α 
(const.) 
β1 
(pit-1)  
β2 
(pit+1
exp) 
δ 
(pit
for) 
γ 
(yt-1) 
η 
(st-2, st-1*) 
µ 
(it-4) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
CZE -0.76 (0.55) 0.49 (0.04) 0.40 (0.10) 0.80 (0.27) 0.31 (0.11) -0.07 (0.02) 0.12 (0.03) 0.91 0.40+ 
HUN  -0.33 (0.90) 0.60 (0.07) 0.60 (0.07) 0.64 (0.38) -0.19 (0.31) -0.07 (0.03) 0.14 (0.05) 0.95 0.89 
POL  -0.59 (0.68) 0.66 (0.10) 0.57 (0.15) 0.40 (0.31) 0.15 (0.16) -0.04* (0.01) 0.09 (0.04) 0.96 0.79 
ROM 6.07 (2.73) 0.87 (0.14) 0.45 (0.14) -2.41 (1.37) -0.11 (0.23) -0.12* (0.06) -0.02 (0.10) 0.98 0.10 
SLO 0.64 (0.82) 0.31 (0.11) 0.45 (0.20) 0.47 (0.29) 0.36 (0.18) -0.43* (0.10) 0.11 (0.07) 0.96 0.67 
SVK  -0.50 (1.76) 0.64 (0.05) 0.56 (0.07) 0.99 (0.52) 0.10 (0.27) -0.10 (0.03) -0.14 (0.10) 0.95 0.12+ 
BUL 0.21 (2.42) 0.32 (0.08) 0.55 (0.09) 1.74 (0.88) 0.90 (0.28) 0.02* (0.05) 0.09 (0.30) 0.76 0.22 
CYP 1.06 (0.50) 0.84 (0.05) 0.59 (0.05) 0.82 (0.29) 0.08 (0.05) -0.16* (0.03) 0.05 (0.07) 0.83 0.41+
EST (diff) 0.02 (0.08) 0.44 (0.11) 0.39 (0.15) 1.68 (0.48) -0.08 (0.10) 0.04* (0.07) 0.02 (0.06) 0.56 0.23+
LAT (diff) 0.12 (0.11) 0.37 (0.21) 0.36 (0.12) 0.56 (0.31) -0.29 (0.18) -0.05* (0.04) 0.10 (0.06) 0.29 0.26 
LIT -0.56 (1.14) 0.89 (0.07) 0.46 (0.12) 0.38 (0.51) 0.43 (0.16) -0.03* (0.06) 0.09 (0.05) 0.89 0.60 
MAL 0.54 (0.75) 0.66 (0.08) 0.62 (0.06) -0.21 (0.33) -0.03 (0.03) -0.01* (0.02) 0.17 (0.04) 0.67 0.07+
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients statistically significant at 5% in bold. LB is p-value of Ljung-Box test for 1. 
order serial correlation (+ indicated result after correction for AR(1) in residuals). diff – relation estimated in first differences, 
otherwise in levels. st – yearly change of the nominal bilateral exchange rate w.r.t. the euro (countries in the 1. block) and yearly 
change of the real effective exchange rate (countries in the 2. block). 
 
The results reveal two basic properties of the inflation process: (a) the relative strength of 
backward versus forward-looking components that can be (with some degree of 
simplification) linked to the way in which prices are set. In particular, whether the economic 
subject are backward or forward-looking; (b) what is the exogenous variable that drives up 
inflation rate in the short-term. As for the first characteristics, the forward-looking component 
dominates in some countries (BUL, CYP, SLO), the backward-looking component is 
predominant in others (HUN, LIT, POL, ROM, SVK) or both components are of similar 
magnitude (CZE, EST, LAT, MAL). As for the identification of exogenous variable driving 
inflation, we find the following. A statistically significant effect of the inflation rate in the 
Euro area (coefficientδ ) is found for three countries (CYP, CZE, EST). A positive significant 
relation between inflation rate and the output gap (coefficientγ ), in the spirit of a traditional 
PC, is confirmed in four countries (CZE, SLO, BUL, LIT).35 We detect a negative significant 
                                                          
34
 As a robustness check, we reestimate the equation by means of GMM (2 lags included as instrumental 
variables) finding reasonably similar estimates of most parameters. Only the coefficient of the foreign interest 
rate substantially increased its size. In some cases, the coefficient of expected inflation increased in detriment to 
the lagged inflation. 
35
 It was reported elsewhere that the Phillips curve became flatter. There are several possible explanations like 
the effects of globalization, less nominal price adjustments (due to lower trend inflation) or an increase of central 
banks credibility. 
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response to a (nominal) exchange rate appreciation (coefficientη ) in all countries that 
maintained flexible exchange rate. Therefore, if the exchange rate depreciates (decrease of our 
variable) the domestic inflation rate increases as the imports become more costly. Yet, limited 
size of this coefficient shows that the ERPT is very incomplete. For the countries that 
maintain exchange rate pegs, we use the REER (against 12 main trading partners and deflated 
by CPI) instead but do not find a significant response to this variable (with an exemption of 
Cyprus). These findings are in line with empirical studies on the ERPT (Gagnon and Ihrig, 
2004, Campa and Goldberg, 2005), which confirmed its significant decrease over the last 
decades as a result of a low inflation environment. Moreover, the ERPT falls away throught 
distribution channel and its impact on final consumer prices is limited.36 Finally, the response 
to (four-periods) lagged interest rate, which tracks the effect of monetary policy, is mostly 
insignificant. However, there are four countries where this coefficient is significant and 
displays positive rather than negative sign. This finding is counter-intuitive from the New-
Keynesian point of view suggesting that an interest rate increase must lead to a decrease of 
the inflation rate. On the contrary, the Post-Keynesian cost-push theories of inflation argue 
that the interest rate is a cost in a productive process and its increase can have positive rather 
than negative effect on the inflation rate. 
 
The previous analysis does not point to any distinctive pattern in inflation persistence (as 
represented by coefficient 1β ) between countries with flexible exchange rate (and autonomous 
monetary policy) and countries using hard pegs. To get better picture on this issue we pool up 
the data for countries with flexible exchange rate (CZE, HUN, POL, ROM, SLO, SVK) and 
fixed exchange rate (BUL, CYP, EST, LAT, LIT, MAL) and apply the panel analysis. This 
setting is useful for overcoming the small sample bias but it also can bias the result if the 
homogeneity of slope coefficient is not justified. We use a fixed effect model with cross-
section SUR weighting (LSDV, both in levels and first differences) and test the homogeneity 
of coefficients by Wald Test. The results are reported in Table 4. 
                                                          
36
 Orlowski (2005) used similar model as ours and confirmed that the ERPT effect was very limited in CZE, 
HUN and POL. Coricelli et al. (2006) found (by means of cointegration framework) a weaker ERPT in countries 
with DIT and flexible exchange rate (CZE, POL) and stronger where exchange rate was more rigid (HUN, SLO). 
Babetskaia-Kukharchuk (2007) reports for the Czech Republic that the CPI inflation rate response to the 
exchange rate shock occurred mostly within the first six months and its peak response was 8 – 12%, which is 
very similar to the our coefficient - 7%. Moreover, she confirms that the ERPT decreased in time, which may be 
related to the regime of inflation targeting. Bitans (2004) reports for the Czech Republic cumulative ERPT after 
first 6 months 9%, for Hungary 20% (us 7%), Poland 31% (us 4%), Romania 23% (us 12%), Slovakia 21% (us 
10%) and Slovenia 23% (us 43%). Unlike us, they also find the ERPT in rage of 20-30% for countries with 
exchange rate pegs to the euro. In any case, the VAR estimates of the ERPT are not fully comparable to our OLS 
estimates of the open economy PC. 
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Table 4.: LSDV estimates with cross-section SUR weighting of the open economy Phillips curve for panels 
of 6 countries with flexible exchange rate and 6 countries with exchange rate pegs 
 
 
α 
(const.) 
β1 
(pit-1)  
β2 
(pit+1
exp) 
δ 
(pit
for) 
γ 
(yt-1) 
η 
(st-1) 
µ 
(it-4) 
R 2 
 
DB 
 
Flexible (levels)   0.79 (0.03) 0.52 (0.04) 0.33 (0.18) -0.05 (0.06) -0.05 (0.01) 0.07 (0.00) 0.98 2.21 
Wald Test   0.00 0.49 0.15 0.18 0.01 0.07   
Fixed (levels) 
 
 0.68 (0.04) 0.46 (0.05) 0.50 (0.21) -0.03 (0.04) -0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.03) 0.73 2.10 
Wald Test 
 
 0.00 0.75 0.08 0.01 0.12 0.46   
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients statistically significant at 5% in bold. DW is Durbin-Watson statistics applied 
as stacked residuals (+ indicated result after correction for AR(2) in residuals). st is real effective exchange rate 
 
We conclude that coefficient homogeneity across all countries is often rejected. However, 
even if we for simplification assume homogeneity, there is still no indication about 
substantially different degree of inflation persistence between the two groups. 
 
6. Inflation and monetary policy 
 
The prevailing NK literature (e.g. Clarida et al. 1998, 2000) argues that an appropriate 
monetary policy rule is decisive for plausible inflation outcomes.37 We have shown that de-
jure monetary policy regimes in the NMS can be accompanied by empirical estimates of 
interest rate rules, which are very rough indications of de-facto monetary policy.  In 
particular, the (expected) inflation rate seems to drive the interest rate dynamics in countries 
with flexible exchange rates and the rule of interest rate peg are presumably applied in 
countries pursuing stable exchange rate. However, we do not find any distinctive feature of 
inflation dynamics between these two groups of countries. 
 
The inflation rates in the CEEC in overall decreased since the accomplishment of the 
economic transition. It is interesting to ask whether the monetary policy as tracked by our 
estimates of the policy rules makes a difference with regard to price stability. The inflation 
rate (see Table 5.) provides the most straightforward information on the price stability but it is 
not suitable for cross-country comparison given that the levels of inflation significantly 
differed at the beginning of the period of analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
37
 The debate on the sources of the Great Moderation is still open and many argue that it was rather a good luck 
(benign environment) than a good policy what drove the overall decrease in the inflation rates. 
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Table 5.: Summary of some descriptive statistics HCPI inflation series (1999-2007) 
 
 Country mean st.dev. max. max. 
CZE 2.31 1.50 5.03 -0.60 
HUN  6.81 2.59 10.93 2.40 
POL  3.88 3.10 10.87 0.33 
ROM 21.88 15.98 53.80 3.87 
SLO 5.46 2.49 9.53 2.17 
SVK  6.48 2.89 16.07 1.37 
BUL 6.19 3.05 11.83 -0.83 
CYP 2.56 1.30 5.63 0.33 
EST 4.00 1.74 9.23 0.63 
LAT 4.65 2.29 13.63 1.00 
LIT 1.86 2.14 7.90 1.60 
MAL 2.33 0.97 3.57 -0.90 
 
Although there is some empirical evidence that inflation targeting drives down the inflation 
persistence (Kantonikas, 2004), our previous analysis has not confirmed this claim. However, 
besides the inflation rate there is another relevant statistics: the inflation volatility. If inflation 
is volatile, there is greater uncertainty about its future level, which has negative impact on the 
agents’ inflation expectations. In particular, we aim at conditional volatility. Some studies for 
developed countries found that the inflation process is conditionally heteroskedastic (Dolado 
et al., 2004). Consequently, we allow for conditional heteroscedasticity in residuals of the 
open economy PC and reestimate the specification (8) by GARCH(1,1). The open economy 
PC estimates (mean equation) are only slightly different from the previous OLS estimates 
they are not reported here.38 The estimates of the variance equation (9) are resumed in Table 
6. 
 
Since all three parameters of the variance equation are significant only in few cases, GARCH 
(1,1) may not be an appropriate model. However, the estimates give an insightful account of 
the conditional inflation variance. The constant term ω , which is an estimate of the long-term 
inflation variance (unconditional inflation variance), and the GARCH term 2ν  representing 
the impact of forecast variance from the last period, are significant in all countries with fixed 
exchange rate regimes. On the contrary, the coefficient of the long-term variance is not 
significant for countries with flexible exchange rates that pursued more independent monetary 
policy. The coefficient of the ARCH term 1ν  is mostly negative or insignificant, confirming 
that the impact of new information from the last period is quite limited. 
 
                                                          
38
 As the standard errors decreased, the significance of several estimated coefficients increased. 
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Table 6.: The estimates of the variance equation from the open economy Phillips curve estimated by 
GARCH(1,1) 
 
Country 
 ω 
(const.) 
1ν  
(ξt-1
2
 
)  
2ν  
(σt-1
2) 
CZE 0.05 (0.04) -0.33 (0.14) 0.99 (0.16) 
HUN  0.15 (0.10) -0.12 (0.05) 0.61 (0.36) 
POL  0.01 (0.01) 0.11 (0.14) 0.68 (0.15) 
ROM 0.14 (0.07) 0.20 (0.13) 0.48 (0.11) 
SLO 0.24 (0.34) -0.20 (0.16) 0.02 (1.70) 
SVK  0.00 (0.00) -0.11 (0.08) 1.01 (0.25) 
BUL 0.19 (0.09) -0.27 (0.14) 1.10 (0.11) 
CYP 0.11 (0.04) 0.78 (0.24) -0.57 (0.29) 
EST (diff) 0.15 (0.07) -0.19 (0.12) 0.69 (0.26) 
LAT (diff) 0.17 (0.05) -0.32 (0.13) 0.78 (0.20) 
LIT 0.06 (0.03) -0.20 (0.11) 0.88 (0.02) 
MAL 0.04 (0.00) -0.27 (0.06) 0.92 (0.15) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients 
statistically significant at 5% in bold. 
 
This evidence suggests that the policy of interest rate pegs may be detrimental for domestic 
price stability. This may be so because the inflation process of any of these countries but 
Cyprus was significantly affected by the inflation developments of the Euro area (see Table 
3). The exchange rate flexibility and autonomous monetary policy, in particular DIT, seems to 
be superior as the countries that applied this policy were able not only to decrease the level of 
inflation but also its (long-term) volatility. The series of conditional inflation variances are 
plotted together with HCPI inflation rates in Figure 2. 
 
The figure clearly documents that the experience of the countries, which adopted explicit DIT 
(CZE, HUN, POL, ROM), was the most fortunate with regard to the objectives of the price 
stability. Poland and Romania achieved a significant disinflation during this period, 
employing a monetary policy rule consisting in a very strong response to expected inflation. 
The decrease of the inflation variance was also considerable in these countries. Romania 
adopted explicit inflation targeting only in 2005 but the policy rule estimates reveal that it 
pursued very strict anti-inflationist policy during the whole period of our analysis. This holds 
even thought the Romanian national bank officially sought to stabilize both the domestic 
prices and the exchange rate between 1999 and 2004.39 Given the existence of significant 
ERPT, responding to foreign exchange rate was not detrimental for domestic price stability. 
The response to expected inflation rate was weaker in Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
Consequently, the inflation rate decreased relatively less in Hungary than in Poland and 
                                                          
39
 We report for Romania the rule with domestic inflation only because it has the highest explanatory power. 
However, even when the exchange rate was included, we have still found very strong response to inflation. 
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Romania alike the conditional inflation variance. The Czech Republic achieved good 
outcomes with more flexible version of the DIT the interest rate developments in the Euro 
area with rather persistent inflation volatility. Slovakia claimed to apply the DIT but we fail to 
detect any response to domestic inflation rate. According to our results, the Slovak short-term 
interest rate responded very strongly to the euro interest rate. A direct impact of the inflation 
in the Euro area on Slovak inflation is not evident (rejected by the OLS specification of PC 
but confirmed by GARCH) and the policy of shadowing the ECB decisions seems to have 
given mixed outcomes. Although the inflation rate generally decreased its evolution has been 
still turbulent in the analyzed post-transformational period. The inflation increased from 7% 
in early 1999 up to 15% one year later and similarly from 3% up to 9% between 2002 and 
2003. Slovenia experienced similar inflation jump from 5% in 1999 up to 10% in 2000-2002 
but since then it has seen a steady disinflation process. Slovenia did not adopt the DIT and 
proclaimed to pursue monetary targeting regime but we have identified only negligible 
response to monetary growth while the response to domestic inflation rate was very strong. 
 
None of the countries that aimed at exchange rate stabilization (CYP, EST, LAT, LIT, MAL) 
but one (BUL) experienced a significant inflation decrease since 1999. The common 
monetary policy, de facto imported by an interest rate peg, seems to have been too permissive 
to leash the inflationary tendencies embedded in the domestic economies.40 On the other hand, 
Lithuania experienced two-year period of deflation. Therefore, although the exchange rate 
pegs had certainly a positive impact on the initial disinflation, its subsequent maintenance 
proved problematic for countries whose economic fundaments differed from those of the 
anchoring economy. 
                                                          
40
 The situation of these countries resembles the developments of EMU members like Greece or Portugal, 
suffering positive inflation differential with respect to other EMU members. 
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Figure 2.: HCPI-based inflation rate (left figure) and conditional inflation variance (right figure) (1. group 
– CZE, HUN, POL, SVK, 2. group – CYP, MAL, SLO, 3. group – EST, LAT, LIT, 4. group – BUL, ROM) 
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7. Conclusions 
 
This paper presents joint empirical evidence on monetary policy rules and on sources of 
inflation dynamics in small open economies, in particular in the 12 new EU members. 
 
The estimated monetary policy rules point to a significant heterogeneity in interest rate 
setting, which is related to a variety of exchange rate arrangements in the NMS. We confirm a 
significant response of the short-term nominal interest rate to domestic inflation mostly for the 
inflation targeters. On the contrary, the policy rules of countries with hard exchange rate pegs 
seems to consist in mimicking the interest rate setting in the Euro area without major 
consideration of domestic macroeconomic developments. This evidence indicates that 
countries usually pursue either target for domestic inflation or for the exchange rate. 
However, it does not necessary imply that both targets cannot not be pursued simultaneously, 
especially if the domestic inflation has significant foreign component. The findings obtained 
for the countries with inflexible exchange rates can be loosely interpreted that a credible 
interest rate peg may constitute a means to fix the exchange rate. However, all our results are 
conditioned by rather strong assumption that the short-term interest rate is exogenously set by 
central bank while in reality it may endogenously adjust, e.g. to exchange rate interventions. 
 
Our estimates of an open economy Philips curve point to the diversity of sources of the 
inflation process. In particular, the inflation rates are driven not only backward persistency but 
also hold a forward-looking component. The aggregate economic activity and foreign 
inflation development have direct impacts only in a few countries. In countries with flexible 
exchange rates, we identify that the exchange rate passes through to domestic consumer 
prices, although rather incompletely. 
 
The nexus between the estimated monetary policy rules and the sources of the inflation 
process gives indications on the viability of the monetary policy setting for price stability. In 
particular, we find that the long-term component of the conditional inflation variance is higher 
in countries with exchange rate pegs. Consequently, inflation targeting seems to be a 
preferable strategy to exchange rate peg because it allows decreasing not only the inflation 
level but also its volatility. 
 
There are several possible extensions of this research. We will point here only to three issues. 
First, although our objective was not to provide empirical evidence on the New Keynesian 
policy model (NKPM), we have estimated versions of two principal equations of this 
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framework (monetary policy rule and the Phillips curve). Therefore, a natural extension could 
be their joint estimation, possibly also with the IS that completes the system, if any cross 
restrictions applies (Giordani, 2004). The estimation of complete NKPM has been usually 
carried our by means of VAR methods (Boivin and Giannoni, 2006). Such framework is 
useful for the identification of the effects of diverse shocks rather than for parameter 
estimation. Moreover, while the number of parameters that must be estimates in the system is 
very large the number of observations is rather limited. The preliminary results that we have 
obtained by employing both 3SLS and FIML estimators point to this problem. Cho and 
Moreno (2006) proposed a bootstrapping method to overcome the small-sample bias in this 
setting. Second, the GMM methodology commonly used for estimation of the monetary 
policy rule was recently questioned on ground of identification problems that arise in forward-
looking models (Mavroeidis, 2005). Therefore, a more detailed analysis should be carried out 
on this issue. Finally, we have relied on a potentially controversial variable - the output gap as 
a measure of the real economic activity and a determinant of inflation in the open economy 
PC. The NK literature suggested real marginal cost instead (Galí and Gertler, 1999). 
Unfortunately, this variable is not available with sufficiently long time spam for all the 
countries in our sample. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Previous studies on the monetary policy rules for NMS 
 
Reference Data Specification  β γ ρ 
   Method           
          
Angeloni, Flad CZE, HUN, POL  CZE 0.85 - 0.90 
 and Mongelli 99:01-04:12   HUN - - 0.95 
(2007)  OLS   POL 0.79 0.79 0.90 
     CZE - 0.04 0.99 
Frömmer and  CZE, HUN, POL,   HUN - 0.06 0.97 
Schobert (2006b) SLO, SVK, ROM    POL 0.25 - 0.97 
 94:01-05:02  SLO 0.11 - 0.83 
 GMM  SVK - - 0.82 
     ROM - - 1.01 
      CZE 0.59 0.24 0.83 
María-Dolores  CZE,HUN,POL, SVK HUN 1.25 - 0.91 
(2005) 97/98-03:09 
 
POL 1.20 - 0.92 
 OLS, GMM   SVK 0.11 0.19 0.46 
         
Mohanty and  CZE, HUN, POL CZE 0.33 0.20 0.66 
Klau (2007) 95:01-02:12  HUN - - 0.75 
 GMM   POL 0.16 0.66 0.75 
Note: it -short-term interest rate (coefficient of its first lag - ρ), pit -inflation rate (coefficient β) , yt - output gap (coefficient γ), rt – exchange rate, mt – monetary aggregate, dummy – dummy variable for periods with different 
policy regimes. If more estimates were available, we report the one closest to our specification and estimation 
period. 
 
 
Table A.2. Comparison of the AEG and Johansen tests of cointegration 
 
 
 Monetary policy rule Augmented Phillips curve 
 AEG Test Johansen Test AEG Test Johansen Test 
BUL it, pit+1, it
for
 it, it
for
 pit, pit-1, pit+1
exp
, pit
for
, (it-4) pit, pit+1
exp
, pit
for
, (it-4)   
CZE it, it-1, pit+1, it
for
 it, pit+1, it
for
 pit, pit-1, pit+1
exp
, pit
for
, it-4 pit, pit+1
exp
, pit
for 
, it-4 
CYP none none pit, pit-1, pit+1
exp
, (it-4)  pit, pit+1
exp
, pit
for
, it-4 
EST it, pit-1, it
for
 it, pit-1, it
for
 none none 
HUN it, it-1, pit+1, it
for
 it, pit+1, it
for
 pit, pit-1, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 pit, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 
LAT it, it-1, pit+1, it
for
 none none none 
LIT it, it-1, pit-1, it
for
 it, pit-1, it
for
 pit, pit-1, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4  pit, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 
MAL it, it-1
f
 it, it
for
 pit, pit-1, pit+1
exp
, it-4, st-1 pit, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4, (st-1) 
POL it, it-1, pit+1 it, pit+1 pit, pit-1, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 pit, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 
ROM it, pit+1 it, pit+1 pit, (pit-1), pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 pit, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 
SLO it, pit+1 it, pit+1 pit, pit-1, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 pit, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 
SVK it, pit-1, it
for
 it, pit-1, it
for
 pit, (pit-1), pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 pit, pit+1
exp
, (pit
for), it-4 
Notes: it - short-term interest rate, it
for
- short-term euro interest rate, pit – inflation rate, pit+1
exp
 – expected inflation gap, 
pit
for
 – foreign inflation rate, (.) – cointegration can be achieved with or without these variables. 
 
( )1 1 1, , ,t t t ti f y i dum m ypi − − −=
( )12 1 1, , , , ,t t t t t t ti f y i r r mpi + − −= ∆ ∆ ∆
( )1 1, , ,t t t k t ti f y ipi pi + − −=
( )1 1, , , , , ,gap gapt t t t t t t ti f y i r r rpi pi − −= ∆ ∆ ∆
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Table A.3. Granger causality test between the short-term interest rate of each country (STIR…) and the 
euro interest rate (STIREUR) – left panel and between the short-term interest rate (STIR…) and the 
corresponding long-term interest rate (LTIR…) – right panel 
 
 
  Null Hypothesis F-Stat. P-value Lags    Null Hypothesis F-Stat. P-value Lags 
  STIREUR ≠> STIRBUL 17.24 0.00 1    LTIRBUL ≠> STIRBUL 0.56 0.47 1 
  STIRBUL ≠> STIREUR 2.76 0.11     STIRBUL ≠> LTIRBUL 1.06 0.31  
  STIREUR ≠> STIRCYP 0.33 0.57 1    LTIRCYP ≠> STIRCYP 1.86 0.18 1 
  STIRCYP ≠> STIREUR 1.22 0.27     STIRCYP ≠> LTIRCYP 20.19 0.00   
  STIREUR ≠> STIRCZE 15.73 0.00  1    LTIRCZE ≠> STIRCZE 5.19 0.03 1 
  STIRCZE ≠> STIREUR 1.41 0.24     STIRCZE ≠> LTIRCZE 0.02 0.90   
  STIREUR ≠> STIREST 26.43 0.00  1    LTIREST ≠> STIREST 18.88 0.00 1 
  STIREST ≠> STIREUR 2.39 0.13     STIREST ≠> LTIREST 0.73 0.40   
  STIREUR ≠> STIRHUN 0.05 0.82 1    LTIRHUN ≠> STIRHUN 0.25 0.62 1 
  STIRHUN ≠> STIREUR 0.31 0.26     STIRHUN ≠> LTIRHUN 0.46 0.24   
  STIREUR ≠> STIRLAT 4.59 0.04 1    LTIRLAT ≠> STIRLAT 1.77 0.20 1 
  STIRLAT ≠> STIREUR 0.32 0.57     STIRLAT ≠> LTIRLAT 1.60 0.22   
  STIREUR ≠> STIRLIT 69.84 0.00  1    LTIRLIT ≠> STIRLIT 16.31 0.00 1 
  STIRLIT ≠> STIREUR 1.13 0.30     STIRLIT ≠> LTIRLIT 4.04 0.06   
  STIREUR ≠> STIRMAL 13.80 0.01 1    LTIRMAL ≠> STIRMAL 19.55 0.00 1 
  STIRMAL ≠> STIREUR 0.22 0.64     STIRMAL≠> LTIRMAL 19.16 0.00   
  STIREUR ≠> STIRPOL 2.11 0.16  1    LTIRPOL ≠> STIRPOL 1.34 0.26 1 
  STIRPOL ≠> STIREUR 0.24 0.63     STIRPOL ≠> LTIRPOL 8.27 0.00   
  STIREUR ≠> STIRROM 0.50 0.49 1    LTIRROM ≠> STIRROM    
  STIRROM ≠> STIREUR 0.31 0.58     STIRROM ≠> LTIRROM    
  STIREUR ≠> STIRSLO 0.45 0.51 1    LTIRSLO ≠> STIRSLO 5.22 0.04 1 
  STIRSLO ≠> STIREUR 0.34 0.56     STIRSLO ≠> LTIRSLO 0.26 0.62   
  STIREUR ≠> STIRSVK 4.25 0.02  2    LTIRSVK ≠> STIRSVK 1.94 0.18 1 
  STIRSVK ≠> STIREUR 0.72 0.49     STIRSVK ≠> LTIRSVK 0.26 0.62   
Notes: The presence of the Granger causality of euro short-term interest (domestic long-term interest rate) on the domestic 
short-term interest rate at 5% significance level marked by bold. 
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Tables A.4. Detailed GMM estimates of monetary policy rules of the NMS 
 
 
Bulgaria  
2000:1-2007:4 
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it
for) 
ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   3.31 (0.79) 0.20 (0.13) 0.25 (0.49)     0.11 0.41* 0.40 
FL   5.26 (0.74) -0.17* (0.09) 1.16 (0.34)     -0.85 0.47* 0.95 
BL + SMT 1.08 (0.24) 0.40 (0.66) -0.10 (0.10) 0.73 (0.39)     -0.03 0.13* 0.71 
BL + SMT + FIR 0.63 (0.35) 0.30 (0.75) -0.08 (0.07) 0.08 (0.37) 0.64 (0.35)   0.42 0.93 0.37 
BL + FIR   1.46 (0.43) 0.04 (0.08) -0.64 (0.20) 0.79 (0.16)   0.44 0.58 0.73 
BL + FIR + REER 
 
 2.25 (0.23) 0.00 (0.07) -0.02 (0.16) 0.64 (0.16) 0.05 (0.01) 0.51 0.05 0.64 
BL + FIR + SHI 
 
 1.44 (0.43) 0.04 (0.03) -0.20 (0.30) 0.76 (0.11) 0.00* (0.00) 0.19 0.67 0.62 
BL + FIR + MA 
 
 1.86 (0.51) 0.00 (0.10) -0.38 (0.23) 0.50 (0.09) 0.03* (0.04) 0.33 0.17 0.73 
BL + FIR + LTIR 
 
- -             
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients statistically significant at 5% in bold. LB is p-value of Ljung-Box test for 1. 
order serial correlation. * indicated result after AR(1) correction, after AR(1), AR(2) correction.. J-stat is p-value of Sargan 
overidentification test. Best rule is in bold. Additional variables x: NER – nominal exchange rate EUR/USD, REER - real effective 
exchange rate, SHI – asset prices, MA – monetary growth, LTIR – long-term interest rate. 
 
 
Cyprus  
2000:2-2007:4 
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it
for) 
ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   5.53 (0.84) -0.34 (0.29) 0.99 (0.71)     0.62 0.23* 0.46 
BL + SMT 0.85 (0.16) 0.37 (0.94) 0.18 (0.20) -0.29 (0.73)     0.86 0.50* 0.49 
BL + SMT + FIR 0.45 (0.21) 2.38 (0.77) -0.09 (0.07) 0.16 (0.15) 0.11 (0.19)   0.90 0.18* 0.63 
BL + SMT + FIR (diff.) 0.22 (0.08) -0.07 (0.08) -0.14 (0.05) 0.10 (0.12) 0.69 (0.19)   0.35 0.57* 0.69 
BL + FIR   3.45 (1.19) -0.05 (0.07) 0.16 (0.21) 0.39 (0.33)   0.90 0.00* 0.79 
BL + SMT + REER 0.77 (0.24) 0.86 (1.80) 0.11 (0.13) -0.29 (0.24)   0.24 (0.27) 0.86 0.21* 0.24 
BL + SMT + SHI 0.40 (0.13) 2.81 (0.72) 0.04 (0.04) 0.39 (0.28)   0.00* (0.00) 0.81 0.74* 0.55 
BL + SMT + MA 1.27 (0.25) -2.28 (1.24) 0.15 (0.06) -0.51 (0.16)   0.04* (0.02) 0.78 0.13* 0.57 
BL + SMT + LTIR 0.52 (0.81) 0.45 (0.71) -0.04 (0.11) 0.17 (0.28)   0.34 (0.54) 0.87 0.02* 0.49 
Notes: See for Bulgaria. diff. – equation estimated in first differences  
 
 
Czech republic  
1999:1-2007:3 
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it
for) 
ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
FL   1.84 (0.49) 0.22* (0.11) 0.38 (0.29)     0.95 0.44 0.24 
FL + SMT 0.70 (0.03) 0.45 (0.22) 0.19* (0.06) 0.09 (0.07)     0.94 0.13 0.71 
FL + SMT + FIR 0.63 (0.04) -0.62 (0.19) 0.16* (0.03) -0.23 (0.08) 0.41 (0.10)   0.97 0.24 0.88 
FL + SMT + FIR (infl. gap) 0.65 (0.05) -0.54 (0.30) 0.18* (0.07) -0.25 (0.13) 0.48 (0.12)   0.95 0.04 0.83 
FL + FIR 
 
 0.53 (1.76) 0.22* (0.07) 0.00 (0.55) 0.42 (0.58)   0.95 0.42 0.38 
FL + SMT + FIR + REER 0.66 (0.03) -0.43 (0.25) 0.11* (0.04) -0.10 (0.13) 0.40 (0.08) -0.02 (0.02) 0.97 0.87 0.47 
FL + SMT + FIR + NER 0.66 (0.03) -0.61 (0.22) 0.17* (0.06) -0.22 (0.10) 0.38 (0.09) 0.00 (0.01) 0.97 0.67 0.63 
FL + SMT + FIR + SHI 0.64 (0.04) -0.65 (0.18) 0.14* (0.05) -0.21 (0.09) 0.44 (0.10) 0.00* (0.00) 0.96 0.15 0.90 
FL + SMT + FIR + MA 0.64 (0.02) -1.07 (0.18) 0.15* (0.03) -0.25 (0.06) 0.48 (0.07) 0.04* (0.01) 0.97 0.02 0.45 
FL + SMT + FIR + LTIR 0.48 (0.16) 0.36 (0.36) -0.06* (0.10) 0.44 (0.20) -0.30 (0.18) -0.47 (0.23) 0.94 0.14 0.76 
Notes: See for Bulgaria. infl. gap – inflation gap (inflation deviation from HP trend value) used instead of inflation rate   
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Estonia  
1999:1-2007:3 
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it-1
for) 
ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   4.43 (1.80) -0.22 (0.44) 0.46 (0.21)     0.83 0.50* 0.87 
FL   1.87 (0.81) 0.33* (0.17) 0.16 (0.15)     0.90 0.37* 0.45 
FL + SMT 0.82 (0.03) 0.25 (0.09) 0.08* (0.02) 0.10 (0.04)     0.75 0.10* 0.36 
FL + SMT + FIR (t-1) 0.54 (0.02) 0.04 (0.13) 0.09* (0.03) 0.06 (0.05) 0.39 (0.08)   0.92 0.76 0.74 
FL + FIR   -0.68 (0.26) 0.05* (0.06) -0.13 (0.05)     0.19 0.00 0.68 
FL + SMT + FIR + REER 0.54 (0.02) 0.07 (0.14) 0.06* (0.05) 0.06 (0.04) 0.40 (0.07) 0.03 (0.04) 0.92 0.87 0.83 
FL + SMT + FIR + SHI 0.56 (0.03) -0.28 (0.31) 0.10* (0.03) 0.04 (0.06) 0.43 (0.07) 0.00* (0.00) 0.92 0.62 0.82 
FL + SMT + FIR + MA   0.12 (0.33) 0.10* (0.17) 0.07 (0.07) 0.38 (0.12) 0.00* (0.03) 0.90 0.90 0.69 
FL + SMT + FIR + LTIR 0.60 (0.06) 0.04 (0.36) 0.13* (0.05) 0.10 (0.07) -0.02 (0.18) 0.17 (0.07) 0.91 0.24 0.62 
Notes: See for Bulgaria 
 
 
Hungary  
1999:1-2007:3 
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it
for) 
ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   6.07 (1.87) 0.13 (0.16) -0.06 (0.80)     0.83 0.13* 0.73 
FL   3.42 (1.12) 0.75* (0.12) -0.88 (0.34)     0.84 0.18* 0.33 
FL + SMT 0.71 (0.11) 1.18 (0.92) 0.20* (0.08) -0.12 (0.58)     0.87 0.17* 0.80 
FL + SMT (infl. gap) 0.67 (0.08) 3.24 (0.91) 0.29* (0.29) -1.21 (0.65)     0.86 0.17 0.68 
FL + SMT + FIR 0.71 (0.06) 0.94 (0.64) 0.27* (0.06) -0.02 (0.37) 0.11 (0.12)   0.87 0.24* 0.34 
FL + FIR   5.47 (1.13) 0.34* (0.16) -4.43 (0.85) 0.67 (0.36)   0.63 0.00* 0.55 
FL + SMT + REER 0.40 (0.12) 3.27 (0.67) 0.41* (0.10) -1.91 (0.52)   -0.03 (0.02) 0.86 0.04 0.81 
FL + SMT + NER 0.63 (0.10) 1.98 (0.80) 0.20* (0.08) -0.67 (0.56)   -0.06 (0.04) 0.89 0.32 0.77 
FL + SMT + SHI 0.76 (0.04) 0.88 (0.40) 0.17* (0.04) 0.40 (0.31)   0.00* (0.00) 0.84 0.16 0.65 
FL + SMT + MA 0.60 (0.13) 3.40 (1.10) 0.41* (0.09) 0.45 (0.69)   -0.17* (0.05) 0.83 0.41 0.45 
FL + SMT + LTIR 1.58 (0.63) 12.06 (6.10) 0.32* (0.17) 0.23 (1.28)   -2.25 (1.68) 0.57 0.61 0.60 
Notes: See for Bulgaria. infl. gap – inflation gap (inflation deviation from HP trend value) used instead of inflation rate   
 
 
Latvia  
1999:1-2007:3  
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it
for) 
ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   6.42 (1.82) 0.07 (0.25) 1.62 (0.55)     0.54 0.58* 0.39 
FL   4.39 (1.23) 0.25* (0.10) 0.82 (0.27)     0.64 0.16* 0.28 
FL + SMT 0.85 (0.07) 0.81 (0.43) 0.06* (0.03) 0.44 (0.08)     0.74 0.39 0.71 
FL + SMT + FIR 0.62 (0.05) 1.79 (0.98) -0.05* (0.08) 0.25 (0.13) 0.10 (0.15)   0.66 0.50 0.55 
FL + FIR   4.84 (1.90) 0.21* (0.10) 0.61 (0.36) -0.34 (0.79)   0.64 0.10* 0.38 
FL + SMT + REER 0.60 (0.06) 2.19 (0.68) -0.04* (0.07) 0.31 (0.09)   0.00 (0.01) 0.74 0.70 0.65 
FL + SMT + NER 0.61 (0.06) 2.39 (0.75) -0.09* (0.10) 0.31 (0.13)   0.01 (0.02) 0.63 0.32 0.55 
BL + SMT + SHI 0.71 (0.08) 1.37 (0.71) 0.00* (0.06) 0.31 (0.07)   0.01 (0.01) 0.72 0.99 0.80 
BL + SMT + MA 0.67 (0.21) 1.19 (2.19) 0.07* (0.24) 0.44 (0.31)   0.02 (0.07) 0.69 0.67 0.77 
BL + SMT + LTIR -0.58 (0.24) -1.97 (0.96) 0.44* (0.05) 0.76 (0.15)   1.46 (0.22) 0.63 0.15 0.76 
Notes: See for Bulgaria. We do not report the results of the differenced model because no specification has positive R 2. 
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Lithuania 
2000:1-2007:4  
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it
for) 
ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   2.17 (0.76) 0.50 (0.23) 0.13 (0.34)     0.82 0.03* 0.47 
FL   2.00 (0.62) 0.33* (0.14) 0.07 (0.34)     0.82 0.01* 0.52 
BL + SMT 0.58 (0.07) 0.90 (0.30) 0.20 (0.10) -0.07 (0.18)     0.83 0.10 0.51 
BL + SMT + FIR 0.44 (0.02) -1.08 (0.31) -0.10 (0.05) 0.21 (0.09) 1.09 (0.12)   0.97 0.05 0.73 
BL + FIR   -0.84 (0.58) 0.10 (0.14) -0.44 (0.20) 1.41 (0.16)   0.89 0.04* 0.36 
BL + SMT + FIR + REER 0.39 (0.02) 0.14 (0.44) -0.10 (0.01) 0.30 (0.05) 0.69 (0.14) 0.11 (0.04) 0.97 0.99 0.69 
BL + SMT + FIR + NER                
BL + SMT + FIR + SHI 0.33 (0.05) -0.29 (0.31) 0.05 (0.12) -0.52 (0.52) 0.71 (0.18) 0.01* (0.01) 0.94 0.21 0.80 
BL + SMT + FIR + MA 0.46 (0.02) -1.05 (0.75) 0.00 (0.08) 0.34 (0.10) 1.06 (0.13) 0.00* (0.02) 0.97 0.30 0.90 
BL + SMT + FIR + LTIR 0.77 (0.07) -0.27 (0.09) -0.03 (0.03) 0.21 (0.01) 0.56 (0.10) -0.10 (0.04) 0.95 0.16 0.87 
Notes: See for Bulgaria. 
 
 
Malta  
2000:4 -2007:4  
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it
for) 
ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   6.43 (1.51) -1.33 (0.57) 1.16 (0.23)     -1.46 0.44* 0.84 
FL   4.47 (1.18) 0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.01)     0.93 0.20* 0.48 
BL + SMT 0.79 (0.11) 1.07 (0.48) -0.14 (0.07) 0.07 (0.03)     0.94 0.73* 0.27 
BL + SMT + FIR (t-1) 0.57 (0.34) 1.59 (0.61) -0.18 (0.04) 0.06 (0.03) 0.10 (0.20)   0.92 0.62* 0.68 
BL + FIR (t-1)   1.03 (0.14) 0.12 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.79 (0.03)   0.95 0.55** 0.28 
BL + SMT + FIR + REER 0.70 (0.25) 1.56 (0.40) -0.32 (0.15) 0.02 (0.04) 0.11 (0.28) 0.06 (0.04) 0.91 0.77 0.89 
BL + SMT + FIR + NER 0.41 (0.17) 0.06 (0.53) 0.09 (0.10) -0.07 (0.04) 0.62 (0.26) 0.05 (0.04) 0.92 0.38 0.76 
BL + SMT + FIR + SHI 0.70 (0.34) 0.94 (0.52) -0.20 (0.07) 0.04 (0.04) 0.20 (0.23) 0.00 (0.00) 0.91 0.78* 0.82 
BL + SMT + FIR + MA   - -            
BL + SMT + FIR + LTIR 0.67 (0.27) 1.28 (0.27) -0.21 (0.06) 0.07 0.04 0.05 (0.20) 0.06 (0.16) 0.90 0.73* 0.61 
Notes: See for Bulgaria. 
 
 
Poland  
1999:1-2007:3  
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it
for) 
ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   2.16 (0.41) 1.99 (0.09) -1.26 (0.17)     0.76 0.00 0.48 
FL   0.56 (0.59) 1.87 (0.19) -1.13 (0.55)     0.55 0.00 0.56 
FL + SMT 0.77 (0.02) 0.00 (0.11) 0.51* (0.07) -0.13 (0.12)     0.98 0.90 0.26 
FL + SMT (infl. gap) 0.93 (0.03) 0.13 (0.39) 0.60* (0.32) -0.23 (0.38)     0.97 0.10 0.50 
FL + SMT + FIR 0.66 (0.08) -2.61 (1.62) 0.80* (0.18) -0.82 (0.41) 0.82 (0.48)   0.98 0.85 0.41 
FL + FIR   -0.22 (2.56) 0.59* (0.16) 0.44 (0.25) 3.10 (0.45)   0.97 0.22* 0.55 
FL + SMT + REER 0.78 (0.02) -0.04 (0.22) 0.50* (0.07) -0.15 (0.19)   -0.01 (0.01) 0.98 0.96 0.46 
FL + SMT + NER 0.78 (0.02) 0.03 (0.11) 0.47* (0.07) -0.15 (0.19)   -0.01 (0.01) 0.98 0.92 0.42 
FL + SMT + SHI 0.93 (0.12) -1.20 (1.00) 0.30* (0.16) -0.21 (0.15)   0.03* (0.02) 0.97 0.69 0.52 
FL + SMT + MA 0.80 (0.02) 0.24 (0.48) 0.64* (0.09) -0.20 (0.23)   -0.06* (0.02) 0.97 0.41 0.95 
FL + SMT + LTIR 0.88 (0.10) 0.63 (0.85) 0.25* (0.08) 0.05 (0.11)   -0.11 (0.23) 0.98 0.10 0.54 
Notes: See for Bulgaria. infl. gap – inflation gap (inflation deviation from HP trend value) used instead of inflation rate   
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Romania  
1999:4-2007:3 
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it
for) 
ζ 
(xt) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   1.09 (1.32) 1.06 (0.04) 1.18 (0.25)     0.95 0.00 0.42 
FL   0.56 (1.52) 1.29* (0.05) 0.27 (0.22)     0.92 0.15 0.33 
FL (infl. gap)   7.29 (3.29) -0.37* (0.76) 0.94 (0.25)     0.92 0.36* 0.43 
FL + SMT 1.82 (0.45) 1.57 (2.40) -1.43* (0.67) 0.27 (1.12)     0.74 0.07 0.29 
FL + SMT + FIR 0.42 (0.22) 1.91 (2.47) 0.57* (0.27) 0.39 (0.42) -0.35 (0.67)   0.95 0.65 0.66 
FL + FIR   21.28 (7.38) 0.41* (0.57) 1.02 (0.27) -4.75 (2.28)   0.90 0.02 0.69 
FL + NER   5.57 (0.91) 0.66* (0.04) -0.18 (0.16)   -0.34 (0.07) 0.93 0.79 0.43 
FL + REER   4.80 (1.04) 0.92* (0.18) 0.62 (0.62)   -0.16 (0.08) 0.91 0.31 0.61 
FL + SHI   -2.26 (1.86) 1.87* (0.18) 3.29 (0.95)   -0.05 (0.02) 0.80 0.02 0.91 
FL + SMT + MA   - -            
FL + SMT + LTIR   - -            
Notes: See for Bulgaria. infl. gap – inflation gap (inflation deviation from HP trend value) used instead of inflation rate   
 
 
Slovenia 
1999:1-2006:4  
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it-1
for) 
ζ 
(xt-1,xt*) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   5.75 (1.87) 0.36 (0.30) 2.64 (0.99)     0.66 0.23 0.95 
FL   0.29 (1.33) 1.32* (0.22) -0.89 (0.80)     0.87 0.83 0.55 
FL + SMT 0.78 (0.12) -0.66 (0.70) 0.38* (0.16) -0.49 (0.38)     0.93 0.87 0.80 
FL + SMT (infl. gap) 0.97 (0.04) 0.08 (0.40) -0.08* (0.18) 0.24 (0.42)     0.94 0.16 0.43 
FL + SMT + FIR 0.96 (0.16) -3.39 (2.19) 0.09* (0.12) -1.26 (0.92) 0.91 (0.47)   0.84 0.72 0.94 
FL + FIR   3.40 (2.48) 0.86* (0.21) 1.37 (0.99) -0.34 (0.61)   0.80 0.21 0.59 
FL + SMT + REER 0.73 (0.12) -0.39 (0.48) 0.39* (0.14) -0.35 (0.27)   0.06 (0.05) 0.93 0.93 0.87 
FL + SMT + NER 0.81 (0.11) -0.73 (0.61) 0.40* (0.15) -0.41 (0.32)   0.07 (0.08) 0.93 0.83 0.84 
FL + SMT + SHI 0.90 (0.12) -0.59 (0.92) 0.24* (0.13) -0.51 (0.50)   -0.01* (0.00) 0.92 0.70 0.86 
FL + SMT + MA 0.68 (0.16) -0.26 (1.03) 0.33* (0.14) -0.20 (0.47)   0.05* (0.02) 0.91 0.26 0.59 
FL + SMT + LTIR -0.03 (0.45) 0.73 (0.45) 0.37* (0.51) 0.17 (0.38)   0.64 (029) 0.90 0.03 0.93 
Notes: See for Bulgaria. infl. gap – inflation gap (inflation deviation from HP trend value) used instead of inflation rate   
 
 
Slovakia  
1999:1-2007:3 
ρ 
(it-1) 
α 
(const.) 
β 
(pit-1, pit+1*)  
γ 
(,yt-1) 
δ 
(it
for) 
ζ 
(xt) 
R 2 
 
LB 
 
J-stat. 
 
BL   5.55 (0.86) -0.08 (0.14) -0.38 (0.27)     0.94 0.20 0.58 
FL   5.05 (0.63) -0.01 (0.11) -0.33 (0.40)     0.94 0.16 0.60 
BL + SMT 0.79 (0.07) 1.17 (0.32) -0.03 (0.07) -0.25 (0.21)     0.94 0.28 0.54 
BL + SMT + FIR (EUR) 0.90 (0.03) 0.21 (0.41) -0.12 (0.03) -0.24 (0.08) 0.23 (0.11)   0.94 0.39 0.47 
BL + SMT + FIR (EUR) 
(infl. gap) 0.88 (0.02) 0.00 (0.37) -0.15 (0.05) -0.06 (0.05) 0.14 (0.07)   0.95 0.95 0.67 
BL + SMT + FIR (CZE) 0.80 (0.04) 0.71 (0.24) -0.09 (0.04) -0.12 (0.09) 0.24 (0.16)   0.94 0.50 0.86 
BL + FIR   7.61 (2.96) -0.22 (0.10) 0.66 (0.34) -1.26 (0.27)   0.88 0.14 0.75 
BL + SMT + NER 0.82 (0.10) 0.31 (0.43) -0.08 (0.05) -0.14 (0.15) 0.32 (0.11) -0.05 (0.05) 0.95 0.39 0.58 
FL + SMT + REER 0.82 (0.10) 0.30 (0.43) -0.08 (0.06) -0.14 (0.16) 0.32 (0.11) -0.05 (0.05) 0.95 0.38 0.58 
FL + SMT + SHI 0.88 (0.03) 0.38 (0.39) -0.13 (0.03) -0.34 (0.09) 0.24 (0.08) 0.00 (0.00) 0.94 0.29 0.56 
FL + SMT + MA 0.62 (0.17) 0.73 (0.39) 0.03 (0.13) 0.58 (0.57) 0.95 (1.10) -0.13 (0.31) 0.93 0.09 0.86 
FL + SMT + LTIR 1.31 (0.27) -1.00 (0.62) 0.12 (0.08) -0.46 (0.27) 1.03 (0.58) -0.86 (0.51) 0.86 0.05 0.70 
Notes: See for Bulgaria. infl. gap – inflation gap (inflation deviation from HP trend value) used instead of inflation rate   
 
TÍTOLNUM AUTOR DATA
Maig  2009The monetary policy rules and the inflation process in 
open emerging economies: evidence for 12 new EU 
members
09.03 Borek  Vasicek
Abril  2009Spanish Pension System: Population Aging and 
Immigration Policy
09.02 Javier  Vázquez Grenno
Març  2009Sobre los subsistemas input-output en el análisis de 
emisiones contaminantes. Una aplicación a las 
emisiones de CH4 en Cataluña
09.01 Francisco M. Navarro 
Gálvez
Vicent  Alcántara 
Desembre  
2008
The monetary policy rules in EU-15: before and after 
the euro
08.10 Borek  Vasicek
Desembre  
2008
Agglomeration and inequality across space:
What can we learn from the European experience?
08.09 Rosella Nicolini
Setembre  
2008
Labor Supply Response to International Migration and 
Remittances in the Republic of Haiti
08.08 Evans Jadotte
Juny  2008Industrial districts, innovation and I-district effect: 
territory or industrial specialization?
08.07 Rafael Boix
Juny  2008Why Catalonia will see its energy metabolism increase 
in the near future: an application of MuSIASEM
08.06 J. Ramos-Martin,
S. Cañellas-Bolta
Març  2008Do creative industries cluster?  Mapping Creative Local 
Production Systems in Italy and Spain
08.05 Luciana Lazzeretti, 
Rafael Boix, 
Francesco Capone
Febrer  2008Los distritos industriales en la Europa Mediterránea: los 
mapas de Italia y España
08.04 Rafael Boix
Gener  2008Different trajectories of exosomatic energy metabolism 
for Brazil, Chile and Venezuela: using the MSIASM 
approach
08.03 Jesus Ramos-Martin,
Nina Eisenmenger,
Heinz Schandl
Gener  2008An application of MSIASM to Chinese exosomatic 
energy metabolism
08.02 Mario Giampietro,
Kozo Mayumi,
Jesus Ramos-Martin
Gener  2008Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal and 
Ecosystem Metabolism (MUSIASEM): An Outline of 
Rationale and Theory
08.01 Mario Giampietro,
Kozo Mayumi,
Jesus Ramos-Martin
Novembre  
2007
Actividad económica y emisiones de CO2 derivadas del 
consumo de energía en Cataluña, 1990-2005. Análisis 
mediante el uso de los balances energéticos desde una 
07.10 Vicent Alcántara 
Escolano,
Emilio Padilla Rosa,
Novembre  
2007
Actividad económica, consumo final de energía y 
requerimientos de energía primaria en Cataluña, 1990-
2005. Análisis mediante el uso de los balances 
07.09 Jordi Roca Jusmet,
Vicent Alcántara 
Escolano,
